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This paper examines the determinants of the backward vertical linkages of Japanese foreign affiliates in 
manufacturing for the period 1994-2000, focusing on the local backward linkages, or local procurements 
in the host country. Our major findings are twofold. First, the unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics 
explain the large part of the variation of the backward linkages among foreign affiliates. Second, the 
experience of the affiliate has positive and sometimes non-linear impacts on local procurements for the 
affiliates, especially in Southeast Asia and China. (81 Words) 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Backward vertical linkages of multinationals are becoming one of the most important issues in the fields 
of international trade and development economics for two reasons. One is the growing international 
backward linkages. We have witnessed the rapid expansion of foreign trade in intermediate goods, but 
the rate of increase in such trade does not seem attributable only to the reduction in trade barriers.
1 
Instead, growing international backward linkage by multinationals, or growing intermediate input trade 
between headquarters and foreign affiliates, has contributed significantly to the rapid expansion of 
intermediate goods trade (Kleinert, 2001).
2 Indeed, Japanese multinationals in the 1990s are no 
exceptions. Table 1 shows the share of intra-firm exports in total exports of Japanese firms. The share of 
intra-firm exports increased from 33.3 percent in 1994 to 42.7 percent in 2000 for manufacturing as a 
whole.
3
=== Table 1 here === 
The second reason is increased interest in local backward linkages, or local procurements for host 
countries. It is particularly important for developing countries to identify the determinants of local 
procurements of multinationals.
4 This is because the host country could enhance the potential benefits of 
hosting foreign direct investment (FDI) with the increase in local procurements.
5 For instance, 
supporting industries in the host countries are expected to grow, as local procurements increase. 
Moreover, vertical backward linkages could contribute to the technology transfer from multinationals to domestic firms (Javorcik, 2004). 
In light of the growing importance of vertical backward linkages, it appears for Japanese 
multinationals that local backward linkages grew faster than the international backward linkages. Table 2 
presents the local and imported inputs of Japanese foreign affiliates for the period 1990-2000. Imports of 
affiliates in every region expanded from 1991-1995 to 1996-2000. Table 2 clearly shows that the growth 
of local procurements has been faster than the growth of imports. Accordingly, the ratio of local inputs to 
total intermediate inputs in the foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals increased throughout the 
period. 
=== Table 2 here === 
Despite its importance, to the best of our knowledge, only Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao 
(2001) have examined the determinants of local backward linkages of multinationals at the affiliate level, 
focusing on Japanese electronics manufacturing affiliates. Using foreign affiliate-level cross-section data 
for 1992, they conducted cross-section regression analysis. The results indicated that the local 
procurements of Japanese foreign affiliates depended on the quality of infrastructure, the size of the local 
supporting industry or components suppliers, and local content regulations. 
Another related study is Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005) that focused on international 
vertical backward linkages. They investigated affiliates’ demand for imported inputs as a function of 
trade costs, factor prices, and other control variables. Based on U.S. manufacturing firm-level 
cross-section data in 1994, they found that U.S. affiliates’ demand for imported inputs was high if the trade costs were low, if the relative wages of less-skilled labor were low, and if corporate income tax 
rates were low. 
Our study builds upon this previous research. Our contribution is twofold. First, we employ a 
more rigorous theoretical framework than Belderbos et al. (2001). We apply the analytical framework of 
Hanson et al. (2005) to examine the local backward linkages, estimating Japanese foreign affiliates’ 
demand for local inputs based on a Translog cost function. Second, we take into account unobserved 
affiliate-specific characteristics.
6  Both Belderbos et al. (2001) and Hanson et al. (2005) used 
affiliate-level data, but their studies used cross-section analysis. The recent literature on international 
trade has revealed that the trade patterns of plants (or firms) are different even in a given industry.
7 
Indeed, local procurement patterns do not seem to be fully explained by the industry-level factor. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the local procurement ratio for Japanese foreign affiliates in 
four selected industries (textiles, general machinery, electric machinery, and transportation equipment) in 
2000. The local procurement ratio is defined as the share of local intermediate inputs in total costs.
8 The 
figures show wide variations in the local procurement ratios among the affiliates in the four industries 
under study. In textiles, although the average local procurement ratio is 38 percent, approximately 30 
percent of the affiliates indicate less than 10 percent of local procurement. This is also observed in the 
other three industries, implying that heterogeneity of local procurements exists and therefore local 
procurement patterns do not seem to be explained very well by the industry-level factor. Some of this 
heterogeneity can be explained by observable affiliate characteristics. But we should note that affiliate heterogeneity is not necessarily observed. Given these considerations, without controlling for 
affiliate-level heterogeneity, it is difficult to identify the determinants of backward linkages accurately. 
=== Figure 1 here === 
To control for affiliate-level heterogeneity, we have developed affiliate-level longitudinal (panel) 
data, using the confidential survey conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI). The coverage of the data is broader than previous studies. Our data cover more than 1,800 
manufacturing affiliates for 1994-2000, enabling us to examine the differences of the determinants 
among industries. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section explains the estimation model and 
data, and the following section discusses the estimation results. A summary of findings and policy 
implications are presented in the final section. 
2.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
(a) The model 
Denote the cost function of a foreign affiliate   in  industry  i j   located in country c  by 
, where   represents gross output of the affiliate and   is a vector of factor prices. 
The output is produced by a set of inputs 
) , ( ijc ijc ijc y C p ijc y ijc p
n ) ( N n∈ . The second-order Taylor’s series approximation in 
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where  nm mn β β = . Differentiating this function with respect to input prices and then employing 
Shephard’s Lemma, we obtain a cost-share equation of the form: 
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where   represents the price of input  . The higher the value of  , the more 
the affiliate uses the host country’s intermediate inputs, implying that local procurements are high. 
Introducing time dimension   and adding other control variables  , unobserved affiliate-specific 
characteristics 
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where  D α β ln 0 = . Unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics capture the affiliate-specific factors that 
affect the local procurements of foreign affiliates. But these characteristics are not observed because of data unavailability. An example is an affiliate-specific local supply-chain network. For instance, affiliates 
with their specific local supply-chain networks in the host country can purchase local products more 
cheaply than other firms. Such local networks, which may not be observed, can be different among 




We use the micro database of Kaigai Jigyou Katsudou Kihon (Doukou) Chousa (The Survey on Overseas 
Business Activities, hereafter the METI survey) prepared by the Research and Statistics Department, 
METI (1996-2002a). The METI survey is conducted annually by a questionnaire based on 
self-declaration survey forms (one for parent firm and one for each foreign affiliate) given to the parent 
firm. From this annual cross-section survey, we developed panel data for foreign affiliates in 
manufacturing from 1994 to 2000. The detailed description of the data is provided in an Appendix below. 
The number of foreign affiliates exceeds 1,800 for each year. The lists of countries and industries are 
presented in Tables A1 and A2, respectively. 
(ii) Cost share of local inputs:   
D
ijct s
The cost share of local inputs for our analysis is defined as local intermediate inputs divided by total 
costs.
10 Total costs are defined as the sum of intermediate input purchases, wage payments, interest 
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The input price of labor   is defined as annual average wages. Since it is difficult to obtain average 
wages at the firm level, we use the industry average wage of foreign affiliates by country. This in turn 







The prices of capital and domestic intermediate inputs at the industry level are not available for 
most of the countries listed in Table A1. We assume that the prices of capital and domestic intermediate 
inputs are affiliate-specific, unobserved, and fixed across time.
11 This implies that these prices, together 
with unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics  i θ , are represented as an unobserved affiliate-specific 
fixed effect  i ω . That is, 
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A large part of intermediate inputs is traded within the same firm located in different countries 
(intra-firm trade). We thus assume that the imported inputs of each affiliate come from the same industry 
in Japan. This assumption can be justified because the share of imported inputs from Japan in total 
imported inputs is quite high.
12 Following Hanson et al. (2005), we assume that   is decomposed 
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where   is the input price index of intermediates in industry 
M
jt p j ,  ct τ  is the ad valorem tariff rate 
that country   levies on imports, and   is the ad valorem freight rate on imports from Japan to 
country  . 
c ct g
cFor  , we use the sectoral-input-price index of manufacturing industry in Japan, which comes 
from the Bank of Japan (2004). To control for the effects of exchange rate movements, we multiply the 
sectoral-input-price index by the nominal-exchange-rate index (1989 = 1) obtained from IMF (2004). 
The tariff rate is defined as tariff revenues divided by imports. Both tariff revenues and imports are 
obtained from World Bank (2004). The freight rate is defined as the C.I.F. value of imports divided by the 
F.O.B. value of imports obtained from IMF (2004). 
M
jt p
(iv) Output:    ijct y
Output is defined as sales of a foreign affiliate. To obtain real output, sales are deflated by each country’s 
GDP deflator. The data are taken from the METI survey. 
(v) Other control variables:    ijct Z
Six additional variables are used as control variables and tested for their impacts on the use of local 
inputs. The six variables can be grouped into two sets. One set concerns the characteristics of foreign 
affiliates and parent firms in Japan, and the other the conditions of the host country or host market. For 
the variables in the first group, we used the length of operation ( ), the share of equity of the 
foreign affiliates held by the parent firms in Japan ( ), the share of local sales in total sales 
( ), and the capital-labor ratio of the parent firm ( ). For the variables in the 
second group, we used the value-added of the manufacturing sector ( ) and the presence 
of foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals ( ). The data for the capital-labor ratio of 
parent firm are taken from The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities 
ijct EXPER
ijct SHARE
ijct LOCSALES ijct KLRATIO
ct SUPPLIERS
jct JSUPPLIERSby the METI (1996-2002b), and other variables are from the METI survey. 
The length of operation,  , is included to examine its impact on the local procurement 
ratio. We also include the squared value of    to take into account the possible non-linear effect 
of experience. Foreign affiliates of multinationals without knowledge about local firms have to rely on 
their parent firm or affiliates for the supply of intermediate inputs in the early stages of their operation. 
As foreign affiliates increase their knowledge about the local supply of inputs, they are likely to increase 
local inputs. At least two factors may contribute here. One is the expectation or request from the host 
country to increase local inputs. A host country government may realize the importance of increasing 
local linkages with affiliates in order to promote technology transfer and to develop supporting industries, 
or local input suppliers. Accordingly, the government that is keen on gaining maximum benefits from 
hosting foreign affiliates of multinationals requests foreign affiliates to increase local inputs. 
ijct EXPER
ijct EXPER
The other factor that would lead to increased local inputs is the behavior of foreign affiliates in 
reducing various risks resulting from international transactions. Reliance on imported inputs would place 
the foreign affiliates in a vulnerable position as international transactions are subject to uncertainties 
associated with exchange-rate changes, transportation, communication, and other factors. We would 
therefore expect    to have a positive impact on the share of local inputs in total inputs. If the 
effects of experience are particularly important for the first several years and then diminish afterwards, 
the coefficient of squared values will be negative. 
ijct EXPERThe share of equity of the foreign affiliates held by the parent firm, , is expected to 
have a negative impact on local procurement. Foreign affiliates under tight control of the parent firm tend 
to rely heavily on the parent firm for procurement of inputs, output sales, personnel, and other factors. 
Indeed, the parent firm has an incentive to increase supply or sales of inputs to its subsidiaries in order to 
maintain its business at home. 
ijct SHARE
The share of local sales in total sales of foreign affiliates,  , is included to capture 
the importance of local-market orientation for the determination of input sources. We hypothesize that 
greater local-sales orientation leads to higher reliance on local inputs. Two factors may be considered 
here. First, foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals with high local sales orientation are likely to have 
strong linkage with local firms not only in terms of sales but also in terms of procurement of inputs. 
Second, foreign affiliates engaged in the production of products for the local market rely on local inputs 
because such production tends to require local inputs. 
ijct LOCSALES
The capital-labor ratio of the parent firm   is used to control for the effects of the 
parent firm in Japan. Capital-intensive firms are more likely to possess more firm-specific intangible 
assets than the less capital-intensive firms. This implies that the transaction between a foreign affiliate 
and local firms tends to be low compared with the transaction between a foreign affiliate and its parent 
firm because of transaction costs, imperfect information, and incomplete contracts.
ijct KLRATIO
14 We thus expect that 
an affiliate of capital-intensive firms is more likely to import intermediate inputs from Japan while less 
capital-intensive firms are more likely to use local inputs.   Turning to host-country factors, we include the value-added of manufacturing ( ) 
to capture the availability of inputs from the host country. We expect    to have a positive 
impact on local inputs, since a large manufacturing sector indicates the presence of potential input 
suppliers. The data are taken from World Bank (2004). 
ct SUPPLIERS
ct SUPPLIERS
A limitation of our data is that local procurements may include the procurements from foreign 
affiliates of other Japanese firms in the same country. Japanese firms are argued to have established 
exclusive networks with other Japanese firms in procurement of inputs as well as sales of outputs. In 
order to control for such “Japanese network” effects in the procurement of inputs, we include the 
presence of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms ( ), which is measured by the number of 
foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals in the same country under study. Significantly positive 
coefficients are expected if “Japanese network” has strong effects on the local procurements. The data are 
obtained from Matsuura (2005). 
jct JSUPPLIERS
Another important set of control variables is related to policy effects such as local content 
requirements and restriction on equity participation. However, in our data, these variables are available 
only for 1995 and 1998, implying that the inclusion of the policy effects makes it difficult to conduct 
panel data analysis. We thus exclude the policy effects in this paper but these are addressed in Kiyota, 
Matsuura, Urata, and Wei (2006). 
In sum, our baseline model is specified as follows:               ( 7 )  
.          
         
ln   ln ln
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The definitions of the variables and expected signs of coefficients are summarized in Table A3, while 
summary statistics and the correlation matrix for these variables are presented in Tables A4-A6. 
3.  RESULTS 
(a) Results of baseline model 
Table 3 shows the regression results of equation (7) generated by a pooled OLS and a fixed-effect model 
for all manufacturing (columns [1]-[5]) and for selected industries (columns [6]-[9]).
15 Columns [1]-[2] 
and [6]-[9] are the results for all countries. Columns [3], [4], and [5] present the results for United States, 
East and South East Asia, and China, respectively. Four findings stand out from this table. First, the 
affiliate-specific fixed-effect is likely to be far more important than standard economic variables in 
explaining the local backward linkages. Controlling for the affiliate fixed effect reduces the statistical 
significance of many of the explanatory variables when compared to the OLS estimates, and raises 
R-squares substantially. This implies that the unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics such as local 
supply-chain networks in the host country may play an important role in expanding the backward 
linkages. This differs from previous studies.
16 This also implies that the determinants of the local 
procurement patterns can be misinterpreted without controlling for unobserved affiliate-specific 
characteristics. Second, in manufacturing, the coefficients of  ,  ,   are 
positive and statistically significant. The results thus suggest that local procurements will be high for 
affiliates with a high local-sales orientation or for countries where the presence of Japanese foreign 
affiliates is high.   
ijc y ln ijct LOCSALES jct JSUPPLIERS
=== Table 3 here === 
Third, the coefficients of   are positive and significant. This implies that experience 
has a significant impact on local procurements. Note that the effect of experience might be different 
across regions in which foreign affiliates are located. Indeed, when we estimate the baseline model 
separately for the United States, East and Southeast Asia, and China, the positive effect of experience is 
confirmed for the affiliates in the United States, and East and Southeast Asia, although the coefficients 
from the different regression results cannot be directly compared each other. Note that, among the control 
variables, a large regional difference is confirmed in experience (Table A5), implying that the effects of 
experience are different across regions. In order to investigate the regional differences in the effects of 
experience in a comparable way, we extend the baseline model to include cross terms between 
  and regional dummies, which will be examined in more detail in the next subsection. 
ijct EXPER
ijct EXPER
The coefficients of   are positive for manufacturing as a whole. However, the results 
for different sectors reveal that the coefficient is significant only for textiles. This result may suggest that 
local textile firms in host countries are well developed and, therefore, the effects of experience diminish 
rapidly relative to other industries. 
2
ijct EXPERNote also that some of the variables such as the share of equity of the foreign affiliates held by the 
parent firm ( ) and the share of local sales in total sales ( ) are different across 
technologies, or industries. For instance, the form of corporate governance is likely to affect the share of 
equity. Similarly, in the food manufacturing industry there might be a closer relationship between local 
sales and local inputs than in the machinery industries. To take into account these differences, we 
estimated the cost function by industry. 
ijct SHARE ijct LOCSALES
The fourth finding is that the significance level of the estimated coefficients is slightly different 
among industries. For instance, the coefficients of   are significantly positive in 
textiles, electric machinery, and transportation equipment, while the coefficients of   
indicate positive and significant signs in manufacturing, textiles, general machinery, electric machinery, 
and transportation equipment. This suggests that there are some differences in the determinants of local 




(b) Regional difference of the impacts of experience 
Table 4 presents the regression results with the cross-term involving experience and regional 
dummies. We include five regional dummies: ASEAN4, China, NIES, Europe, and Other Countries.
17 
“Other Countries” include all other countries except the United States. Therefore, the coefficients reflect 
the difference between the United States and each region. As we confirmed in Table 3, Table 4 indicates 
high adjusted R-squares for aggregated level (all manufacturing) and sectoral level (all four selected industries). Local-sales orientation is also an important determinant at both aggregated and sectoral level. 
=== Table 4 here === 
Contrary to Table 3, Table 4 shows the positive and statistically significant experience effects. At 
the aggregated level, the positive and significant effects are observed in all regions. Significantly positive 
effects are also confirmed at the sectoral level, except for transportation machinery equipment. 
Experience has positive effects on local procurements in general machinery and electric machinery for 
ASEAN4 and China. Strong non-linear effects are also observed in general machinery for ASEAN, China, 
and other countries and in electrical machinery for other countries. These results imply that the effects of 
experience may take different forms among industries and regions. Note also that ASEAN and China 
present significantly positive and relatively large coefficients not only in manufacturing as a whole but 
also in both general machinery and electric machinery. This result suggests that the experience is an 
important determinant of local procurement, especially in Southeast Asian countries and China. 
It is worth noting that the vertical linkage patterns are different across industries. FDI in textiles, 
general machinery, and electric machinery is likely to be horizontal: the same horizontal stage of a 
production process of a product is duplicated in home and host countries. On the other hand, FDI in the 
transportation equipment industry tends to be vertical: a part of the production process of a product is 
separated and relocated into a different country. Although we could not confirm positive effects of 
experience in transportation machinery equipment even after we controlled for the regional difference in 
Table 4, this weak linkage of the transportation equipment industry with local firms may not be surprising. This is because the transportation equipment industry is more vertically integrated between 
production in Japan and foreign production in FDI-hosting countries. 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examined the determinants of the backward vertical linkages of Japanese foreign affiliates 
in manufacturing for the period 1994-2000. In analyzing these linkages, we have focused on local 
procurements. A unique feature of our analysis is the use of affiliate-level panel data, which enables us to 
control for unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics. 
Our major findings are twofold. First, the unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics explain the 
large part of the variation of the backward linkages among foreign affiliates, a finding not known in 
previous studies. This suggests that unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics such as local 
supply-chain network may play an important role in the formation of the backward linkage of foreign 
affiliates. This also implies that the determinants of local procurement patterns can be misinterpreted 
without controlling for unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics. 
Second, experience, which is measured by the length of operation, has positive and sometimes 
non-linear effects on local procurements of affiliates, especially in the Southeast Asian countries and 
China.  This indicates that foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals in Southeast Asia and China 
develop local backward linkages over time, as they accumulate experience in local operation. We 
interpret these results to reflect the existence of “vintage” effects in Southeast Asia and China. Earlier 
established affiliates show significantly higher procurement levels in these countries. The fact that this phenomenon is observed mainly in developing countries may be attributable to 
several factors. One is the difference in the speed of formation of supporting industries, or local input 
suppliers, in these two types of countries. Rapidly expanding supporting industries in Southeast Asia and 
China enable the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms in these countries to increase local procurements. By 
contrast, in developed countries supporting industries are already well established by the time Japanese 
firms set up their affiliates. Thus, there is only limited opportunity for affiliates to increase local 
procurements over time. Another reason may be the closed nature of the procurement network in 
Southeast Asia and China compared with the situation in developed countries. Similar to the case in 
Japan, business practices are rather closed in Asian countries, as firms in these counties pursue a 
long-term relationship based on trust. As such, it takes time for Japanese foreign affiliates to establish 
business relationships with local firms in these countries.   
The second finding has important policy implications. Host governments wishing to increase 
local procurements should develop an attractive and stable FDI environment. Unless foreign firms stay 
long enough, a host country cannot expect foreign firms to develop local linkages. It is well known that 
countries with a stable macroeconomic environment, well-developed infrastructure, including not only 
hard infrastructure such as transportation and communication facilities but also soft infrastructure such as 
law and order, education system, bureaucracy, and open trade and FDI regimes, can attract foreign firms 
and host them for a long time. By the same token, policy makers should recognize that enhancing the 
absorptive capacity of local firms also takes time. In conclusion, there are several research issues for the future that are worth mentioning. First, 
further investigation of backward linkage is an important extension. For instance, we have assumed that 
imported inputs come from the same industry in Japan. However, such an assumption might be 
inappropriate in some industries because the vertical linkage cuts across industries. In order to conduct 
more detailed analysis, input-output table information can be of help to capture the inter-sectoral 
linkages.
18
Second, it is also important to distinguish more clearly the difference between the experience of 
Japanese affiliates and local firms. We have implicitly assumed that both local and incumbent suppliers 
produce the same quality of inputs since beginning production operation in the host country. However, 
the local firms can improve the quality of their supplies through the interaction with Japanese affiliates 
(or technology spillovers from Japanese affiliates to local firms), thereby enhancing absorptive capacity. 
Although a part of the growth of local supplies is controlled for in the regression analysis, we do not 
clearly distinguish the difference of experience between local firms and Japanese firms. 
Third, a study utilizing data on the different countries or periods will add another national 
perspective to the growing body of empirical literature on backward vertical linkages. We found that the 
intermediate inputs trade between headquarters and foreign affiliates was related to the industry 
composition of exports (Table 1). Therefore, the impacts of experience on backward vertical linkages 
may not be the same for different countries and different periods.   
Finally, the linkage of information between a parent firm and its affiliates constitutes an important question for future research. Not only intangible assets but also other parent firm characteristics may 
affect the behavior of foreign affiliates. In this connection, it is also important to identify the source of 
unobserved affiliate-specific characteristics in more detail. Although we found that unobserved 
affiliate-specific characteristics explained the large part of the variation of the backward linkages among 
foreign affiliates, the unavailability of the necessary information precludes us from conducting further 
empirical investigation of the importance of affiliate-specific characteristics in the determination of 
procurement behavior of Japanese foreign affiliates. To conduct such analysis, it is imperative that the 
quality and coverage of the firm- and affiliate-level data must be improved and expanded. 
 APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
This paper uses the micro database of the METI survey. The main purpose of the METI survey is to 
obtain basic information on the activities of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. The METI survey covers 
all Japanese firms that had affiliates abroad (hereinafter referred to as parent firm) as of the end of the 
fiscal year (March 31).
19 A foreign affiliate of a Japanese firm is defined as a firm that is located in a 
foreign country in which a Japanese firm had more than or equal to a 10 percent equity share. Industrial 
classification is available at the 2-digit level. From this annual cross-section survey, we developed a 
longitudinal (panel) data for foreign affiliates in manufacturing from 1994 to 2000. Each affiliate is 
traced throughout the period using the name of the firm as a key.
20 The number of observations is 41,792 
affiliate-years (cumulative total from 1994 to 2000). 
      Further, to control for parent-firm characteristics, we merged the METI survey with the Kigyou 
Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure 
and Activities) by the METI (1996-2002b). This survey was first conducted in 1991, then in 1994, and 
annually afterwards. The survey covers all firms with more than 50 employees and with more than 
capital of 30 million yen, for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The limitation of this 
survey is the lack of some financial information and such firm-group information as keiretsu.
21 The 
number of affiliates whose parent characteristics are available from The Results of the Basic Survey of 
Japanese Business Structure and Activities is 37,708 observations (out of 41,792 observations). 
      We dropped the affiliates from our sample set for which affiliate-age (the year of the survey minus the year of establishment), the number of employees, total sales, local sales, total intermediate 
input, and local intermediate inputs are zeros or missing. Due to missing values for these variables, 16,570 
out of 37,708 observations are dropped, among which 999 observations are dropped due to missing values of 
the local intermediate inputs. After the clean-up of the data, the total number of observation is 21,138 
affiliate-years. 
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1 For instance, using confidential U.S. affiliate-level data over the period 1983-92, Feinberg and Keane (2001) 
found that the imports of U.S. affiliates in Canada did not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
reduction of tariffs in Canada. 
2 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) measured the degree of vertical linkages, using input-output tables from ten 
OECD and four emerging market countries between 1970 and 1990. They found that the use of imported 
inputs to produce exported goods grew about 30 percent during 1970-90. Similarly, Yeats (2001) found that 
the growth of trade in inputs, which now account for 30 percent of world trade in manufactures, was faster 
than the growth of trade in final goods. 
3 A detailed description of the data will be provided in Section 2(b) and the Appendix. Note that there are 
some differences across sectors. Section 3 discusses sectoral difference of backward linkages in more detail. 
4 See, for instance, Lowe and Kenney (1999) for discussion of the consumer electronics industry in Mexico 
and Kelegama and Foley (1999) for discussion of the garment industry in Sri Lanka. UNCTAD (2001) 
reviews several policies to promote linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms, including local 
content requirements.                                                                                                                                                                                   
i
5 “Several less-developed and newly industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America have instituted 
formal local content requirements for foreign investors, while others have made preferential investment status 
conditional on local content, or have put informal pressure on foreign investors to extend their vertical 
linkages.” (Belderbos et al. 2001, p.189) Local content requirements have become illegal under the terms of 
the trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. 
The elimination of regulations is allowed to take place within five years for developing countries and seven 
years for leased developed countries. Some developing countries requested (and are still requesting) to 
postpone the elimination.   
6 Some concrete examples are provided in Section 3(a). 
7 See, for instance, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003). 
8 Total costs are defined as the sum of intermediate input purchases, wage payments, interest payment, rental 
expenses, and depreciation. 
9 This argument may be valid only in the short- and medium-term because local supply-chain networks evolve 
in the long run (i.e.,  θ  becomes  it θ   in the long run). 
10 Because of limited data the availability, we cannot decompose the local intermediate inputs into 
locally-sourced inputs and purchase from other foreign affiliates. 
11 A concern of note is the change of prices through the period. This can be captured by year dummies. 
However, the fixed-effect model does not allow us to include year dummies and “experience” simultaneously. 
Because of data limitations on these factor prices, it is not possible to estimate the system of equations and 
impose cross-equation parameter restrictions (i.e., the symmetry of cross-price derivatives). 
12 For the period of our study the average share for all foreign affiliates was as high as 65.8 percent. 
13 As Hanson et al. (2005) argued, the investigation of the effects of trade costs can provide useful insight into 
the international vertical linkage of multinationals. We addressed this issue in another paper (Kiyota, Matsuura, 
Urata, and Wei, 2007), where we found that high trade costs increased local procurements. 
14 Another possible proxy to capture firm-specific intangible assets is R&D intensity. However, most R&D 
might be a product-specific rather than a firm-specific variable. We thus use capital intensity instead of R&D 
intensity to capture the effect of a firm-specific intangible asset. In our estimation, we confirmed that the                                                                                                                                                                                   
results were generally the same even when we use R&D intensity rather than capital intensity. 
15 Although the dependent variable takes the value between zero and one, we employ a linear model rather 
than a Tobit model. This is because of the incidental-parameter problem. That is, the maximum-likelihood 
estimator of a non-linear model (including a Tobit model) with a fixed-effect and short time periods is 
inconsistent (For more detail, see Hsiao, 2003, p.194). One might think that another possible remedy is to 
apply logit transformation to the dependent variable:  β x s s ′ = − ) 1 / ln(
)} exp( 1 /{ 1
. But such a specification is not 
consistent with equation (1), since logit transformation implies that the cost share should be specified as: 
β x s ′ − + =
0 = s
. Further, the logit transformation means that firms without local procurements (i.e., 
) are excluded from the analysis. Therefore, we do not apply logit transformation. 
16 The F-test indicates that the null hypothesis that all the affiliate-specific effects are zero is rejected at the 1 
percent significance level.   
17 ASEAN includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. NIES includes Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. Europe includes Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. Other Countries include all other countries except the United States. A list of countries is presented 
in Table A2. 
18 For the use of input-output tables to capture inter-sectoral linkages (or supply-chain networks), see Javorcik 
(2004). 
19 Some industries such as financial and insurance and real estate are not covered in the survey. 
20 There are some affiliates that changed their name during our sample period. In this case, we also use 
industry, location, scale, and the information on parent firm to trace the affiliates. For detailed information on 
the construction of the panel data, see Matsuura (2005). 
21 Belderbos et al. (2001) used Nihon no Kigyou Guruupu (Japanese Corporate Groups) by Toyo Keizai Inc. 
to obtain the information on keiretsu. However, we found that the data were not updated after 1999. We thus 
decided to link the METI survey with The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Structure and Activities 
rather than Japanese corporate groups to control for the parent characteristics. For more detailed information 
on The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, see for instance Kiyota and 
Urata (2007). Figure 1. Local Procurement Ratio, 2000
Note: Average local procurement ratio is 38%, 36%, 30%, and 42% for textiles, general machinery, electric machinery, and transportation
          equipment, respectively.
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Local Procurement Ratio (%)Table 1.  The Ratio of Intra-firm Exports to Total Exports







1994 33.3% 9.2% 30.5% 33.5% 36.9%
2000 42.7% 35.4% 28.9% 35.4% 57.4%
Source: METI (1996b, 2002b) The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities.
Table 2.  Backward Linkages of Japanese Firms





1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000
World Total intermediate inputs 75,873 98,428 100.0 129.7 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 45,161 57,164 100.0 126.6 59.5 58.1
Local inputs 30,712 41,264 100.0 134.4 40.5 41.9
United States Total intermediate inputs 29,841 40,046 100.0 134.2 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 14,569 16,991 100.0 116.6 48.8 42.4
Local inputs 15,272 23,055 100.0 151.0 51.2 57.6
Europe Total intermediate inputs 3,042 4,389 100.0 144.3 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 2,598 3,319 100.0 127.8 85.4 75.6
Local inputs 444 1,070 100.0 240.9 14.6 24.4
NIES Total intermediate inputs 11,220 17,733 100.0 158.0 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 7,918 11,177 100.0 141.2 70.6 63.0
Local inputs 3,302 6,556 100.0 198.5 29.4 37.0
ASEAN4 Total intermediate inputs 4,731 7,879 100.0 166.5 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 2,540 3,903 100.0 153.7 53.7 49.5
Local inputs 2,191 3,975 100.0 181.4 46.3 50.5
China Total intermediate inputs 379 2,069 100.0 545.9 100.0 100.0
Imported inputs 250 1,159 100.0 464.2 65.9 56.0
Local inputs 129 910 100.0 703.8 34.1 44.0
Source: The METI Survey.Table 3.  Estimation Results of Cost Function
Dependent variable: local procurements (local inputs / total costs)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Region/country All countries All countries United States
East and
Southeast Asia



















lnPL -0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.009 0.028 -0.013 -0.017 -0.004 -0.016
[-3.40]*** [-0.68] [0.46] [1.39] [1.46] [-0.56] [-1.12] [-0.50] [-1.14]
lnY 0.011 0.027 0.041 0.022 0.017 0.006 0.037 0.015 0.028
[8.23]*** [10.63]*** [6.56]*** [6.83]*** [2.92]*** [0.62] [4.68]*** [3.33]*** [5.09]***
lnPM -0.039 -0.005 0.120 -0.044 -0.094 -0.031 0.039 0.022 -0.077
[-4.52]*** [-0.42] [1.52] [-2.86]*** [-1.48] [-0.73] [0.88] [0.79] [-2.42]***
SUPPLIERS 0.008 0.006 -1.149 0.042 0.235 0.033 -0.023 0.028 0.088
[6.34]*** [0.29] [-1.98]*** [1.69]* [1.76]* [0.43] [-0.40] [0.79] [1.48]
JSUPPLIERS 0.032 0.147 0.461 0.087 -0.025 0.054 0.132 0.228 0.117
[12.70]*** [5.05]*** [2.62]*** [2.53]** [-0.27] [0.47] [1.30] [4.33]*** [1.60]
LOCSALES 0.051 0.126 0.040 0.159 0.236 0.165 0.092 0.145 0.106
[8.85]*** [14.44]*** [1.91]* [13.39]*** [9.35]*** [3.78]*** [3.93]*** [9.98]*** [4.59]***
SHARE -0.209 -0.019 0.001 -0.023 -0.059 -0.024 -0.027 0.017 -0.052
[-24.39]*** [-1.40] [0.03] [-1.14] [-1.50] [-0.42] [-0.87] [0.60] [-1.45]
KLRATIO 0.011 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.049 0.056 0.047 -0.049 -0.015
[3.83]*** [-0.21] [0.54] [-0.21] [2.26]** [2.26]** [1.86]* [-3.36]*** [-0.48]
EXPER 0.004 0.004 0.037 0.005 -0.002 0.018 0.003 0.007 0.007
[4.69]*** [2.05]** [1.65]* [1.86]* [-0.15] [2.58]*** [0.51] [2.04]** [1.32]
EXPER
2 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
[-4.08]*** [-2.03]*** [1.24] [-1.33] [-1.40] [-3.78]*** [-0.43] [-1.13] [-1.40]
Constant -0.035 -1.091 27.886 -1.610 -6.319 -1.185 -0.423 -2.235 -3.071
[-0.96] [-2.36]*** [1.82]* [-2.68]*** [-1.93]* [-0.68] [-0.32] [-2.62]*** [-2.21]***
Estimation method Pooled OLS Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect Fixed-effect
N 21138 21138 4044 13039 3288 1554 2400 5546 3070
Number of affiliates 6372 6372 1213 3937 1055 465 669 1606 926
R-squared 0.056 0.775 0.782 0.762 0.775 0.757 0.755 0.734 0.786
Adj. R-squared 0.056 0.677 0.687 0.659 0.668 0.650 0.659 0.625 0.692
Notes:
Source: The METI Survey
4) For the definition of variables, see main text and Table A3.
1) ***, **, * indicates the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
2) Figures in brackets indicate t-statistics.
3) East and Southeast Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.Table 4.  Estimation Results of Cost Function with Regional Dummies
Dependent variable: local procurements (local inputs / total costs)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]











lnPL -0.003 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 -0.015
[-0.56] [-0.13] [-0.86] [-0.05] [-1.08]
lnY 0.026 0.005 0.032 0.011 0.028
[10.12]*** [0.45] [3.92]*** [2.27]** [5.03]***
lnPM -0.016 0.031 0.054 0.046 -0.085
[-1.20] [0.68] [1.05] [1.56] [-2.50]***
SUPPLIERS -0.012 -0.012 -0.020 -0.007 0.073
[-0.55] [-0.16] [-0.33] [-0.19] [1.19]
JSUPPLIERS 0.093 -0.007 0.157 0.130 0.088
[2.97]*** [-0.06] [1.38] [2.26]** [1.11]
LOCSALES 0.126 0.137 0.095 0.141 0.106
[14.35]*** [3.15]*** [4.03]*** [9.71]*** [4.58]***
SHARE -0.017 -0.033 -0.028 0.025 -0.057
[-1.29] [-0.58] [-0.89] [0.89] [-1.60]
KLRATIO -0.002 0.058 0.047 -0.050 -0.015
[-0.19] [2.32]** [1.82]* [-3.43]*** [-0.49]
EXPER -0.008 0.034 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004
[-2.18]*** [1.08] [-1.35] [-1.30] [-0.48]
EXPER
2 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.82] [-1.34] [1.29] [1.13] [0.93]
EXPER 0.013 -0.055 0.024 0.018 0.015
× ASEAN4 dummy [2.90]*** [-1.59] [1.69]* [1.91]* [1.40]
EXPER
2 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
× ASEAN4 dummy [-0.10] [1.35] [-1.83]* [-0.73] [-1.14]
EXPER 0.022 0.000 0.048 0.045 0.018
× China dummy [3.64]*** [-0.01] [2.47]** [4.01]*** [0.90]
EXPER
2 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
× China dummy [-0.81] [0.54] [-2.50]*** [-1.01] [0.02]
EXPER 0.011 -0.073 0.017 0.009 0.017
× NIES dummy [2.30]** [-1.96]* [1.44] [0.98] [1.39]
EXPER
2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
× NIES dummy [-0.83] [1.63] [-0.60] [-0.51] [-1.88]*
EXPER 0.013 -0.033 0.020 0.014 0.004
× Europe dummy [2.44]** [-0.86] [1.54] [1.27] [0.29]
EXPER
2 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
× Europe dummy [-1.40] [0.73] [-1.56] [-0.53] [-0.36]
EXPER 0.021 -0.027 0.037 0.022 0.014
× Other Countries dummy [3.35]*** [-0.72] [2.21]** [1.52] [1.07]
EXPER
2 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
× Other Countries dummy [-3.04]*** [0.63] [-2.12]*** [-1.78]* [-1.59]
Constant -0.221 0.593 -0.678 -0.559 -2.451
[-0.42] [0.32] [-0.44] [-0.54] [-1.64]
N 21138 1554 2400 5546 3070
Number of affiliates 6372 465 669 1606 926
R-squared 0.775 0.764 0.758 0.737 0.787
Adj. R-squared 0.678 0.657 0.660 0.628 0.692
For notes and sources, see Table 3.Table A1. Number of Foreign Affiliates, by Industry
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Textiles 132 170 186 234 275 284 274
Chemical 174 231 307 307 397 460 459
Basic metal 90 153 159 153 205 236 246
Fabricated metal products 69 58 81 90 118 124 113
General machinery 217 271 315 327 383 439 445
Electric machinery 517 652 733 748 869 991 1,037
Transportation equipment 236 358 428 481 531 505 529
Precision instruments and machinery 53 99 79 95 110 130 131
Other manufacturing 334 462 479 493 607 613 635
All manufacturing 1,822 2,454 2,767 2,928 3,495 3,782 3,869
Table A2. Number of Foreign Affiliates, by Country
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
China 116 281 415 512 604 664 696
United States 419 558 554 555 651 660 647
Thailand 155 209 232 248 308 350 362
Malaysia 141 161 185 182 233 254 269
Indonesia 83 113 136 166 235 237 265
Taiwan 170 197 206 202 234 250 257
Singapore 120 145 162 144 180 192 186
Hong Kong 70 106 122 129 141 165 161
Korea 93 115 118 120 127 149 157
United Kingdom 94 118 117 117 132 134 141
Philippine 34 46 77 95 106 124 126
Germany 74 80 95 84 92 108 111
France 36 36 46 47 58 66 62
Vietnam 1 5 14 29 42 53 60
Canada 36 33 48 48 51 64 57
Brazil 40 54 47 46 55 52 55
India 12 19 22 34 43 51 50
Australia 28 41 34 31 42 39 43
Mexico 19 38 31 25 37 40 38
Netherlands 24 29 26 32 32 36 37
Spain 15 24 28 26 27 25 28
Italy 18 18 23 23 27 30 28
Belgium 16 17 20 24 23 27 24
New Zealand 4866 1 087
Argentina 4333542
Total 1,822 2,454 2,767 2,928 3,495 3,782 3,869
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Log of the number of Japanese affiliates, by country
Log of sales deflated by GDP deflator
Log of the number of employment
Price of the imported intermediate goods
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IMF (2004) and World Bank (2004)
BOJ (2004) and IMF (2004)
The METI survey
IMF (2004) and the METI surveyTable A4. Basic Statistics Table A5. Regional Difference of Control Variables
Variable N Mean S.D. 10 percentile 90 percentile
Local procurements 21138 0.37 0.32 0.00 0.85 World
lnPL 21138 0.46 1.35 -0.87 1.92 United States
lnY 21138 7.58 1.97 5.27 9.95 ASEAN4
lnPM 21138 1.05 0.35 0.64 1.34       Indonesia
SUPPLIERS 21138 27.72 2.25 24.98 32.04       Malaysia
JSUPPLIERS 21138 6.95 0.89 5.93 8.24       Philippines
LOCSALES 21138 0.64 0.39 0.00 1.00       Thailand
SHARE 21138 0.79 0.26 0.40 1.00 China
KLRATIO 21138 2.51 0.74 1.68 3.47 NIES
EXPER 21138 10.54 8.57 2.00 24.00       Hong Kong
EXPER × ASEAN4 dummy 21138 2.40 5.90 0.00 9.00       Korea
EXPER × China dummy 21138 0.68 1.91 0.00 3.00       Singapore
EXPER × NIES dummy 21138 2.90 7.06 0.00 12.00       Taiwan
EXPER × Europe dummy 21138 1.37 4.64 0.00 4.00 Europe
EXPER × Other Countries dummy 21138 1.04 4.60 0.00 0.00 Note: Mean values are reported.
EXPER
2 21138 184.54 285.10 4.00 576.00
EXPER
2 × ASEAN4 dummy 21138 40.61 151.27 0.00 81.00
EXPER
2 × China dummy 21138 4.12 16.50 0.00 9.00
EXPER
2 × NIES dummy 21138 58.20 182.74 0.00 144.00
EXPER
2 × Europe dummy 21138 23.45 125.23 0.00 16.00
EXPER
2 × Other Countries dummy 21138 22.23 128.84 0.00 0.00
Table A6. Correlation Matrix
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]
Local procurements [1] 1.00
lnPL [2] 0.01 1.00
lnY [3] 0.06 0.50 1.00
lnPM [4] 0.01 -0.01 0.04 1.00
SUPPLIERS [5] 0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.67 1.00
JSUPPLIERS [6] 0.09 0.22 0.13 -0.09 0.08 1.00
LOCSALES [7] 0.10 0.19 0.00 -0.10 0.03 0.13 1.00
SHARE [8] -0.18 0.18 0.07 -0.20 -0.23 0.09 -0.13 1.00
KLRATIO [9] 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 1.00
EXPER [10] 0.03 0.13 0.26 -0.19 -0.10 -0.09 0.10 0.04 0.02 1.00
EXPER × ASEAN4 dummy [11] 0.04 -0.17 0.08 0.24 0.10 -0.13 -0.05 -0.19 0.06 0.30 1.00
EXPER × China dummy [12] 0.01 -0.29 -0.11 0.26 0.14 0.24 -0.15 -0.13 0.00 -0.19 -0.14 1.00
EXPER × NIES dummy [13] 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.27 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.46 -0.17 -0.15 1.00
EXPER × Europe dummy [14] -0.11 0.28 0.15 -0.07 -0.23 -0.28 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.23 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 1.00
EXPER × Other Countries dummy [15] 0.04 -0.28 -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.32 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.29 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
EXPER
2 [16] 0.02 0.08 0.19 -0.15 -0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.94 0.29 -0.17 0.43 0.21 0.30 1.00
EXPER
2 × ASEAN4 dummy [17] 0.04 -0.11 0.09 0.17 0.09 -0.08 0.01 -0.17 0.07 0.38 0.93 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 0.40 1.00
EXPER
2 × China dummy [18] 0.01 -0.20 -0.06 0.18 0.10 0.17 -0.12 -0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.91 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 1.00
EXPER
2 × NIES dummy [19] 0.00 0.08 0.11 -0.20 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.50 -0.13 -0.11 0.95 -0.09 -0.07 0.50 -0.09 -0.08 1.00
EXPER
2 × Europe dummy [20] -0.08 0.18 0.11 -0.05 -0.15 -0.18 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.27 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.87 -0.04 0.33 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 1.00
EXPER
2 × Other Countries dummy [21] 0.04 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.22 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.32 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.94 0.35 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 1.00
13.96 24.20 6.92 0.53 0.93
SUPPLIERS
28.03
28.27
32.95
27.72
25.10
27.09
27.98
28.59
27.50
25.12
32.50
28.45
25.95 6.14
6.74
6.13
6.96
6.71
7.55
6.99
5.92
6.62
6.46
6.63
8.23
JSUPPLIERS
6.95
LOCSALES
0.86
0.54
0.52
0.64
0.47
0.44
0.62
0.51
0.63
0.56
0.72
0.69
0.65 0.90
0.71
0.64
0.89
0.79
0.70
0.64
0.83
0.78
0.71
0.72
0.91
SHARE
0.79
KLRATIO
2.55
2.54
2.57
2.51
2.50
2.54
2.56
2.48
2.42
2.35
2.40
2.44
2.52
2.48
11.25
9.88
9.74
10.11
11.34
EXPER
4.37
13.89
11.25
10.54
7.86
10.45
12.96
15.95
EXPER
2
184.54
187.85
167.30
173.51
152.41
119.70
190.10
262.27
353.41
193.99
26.47
278.57
207.81
242.40